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I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act")1
it gave the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
discretion to grant over-the-air broadcasters temporary licenses for additional
spectrum in order to assist their transition to digital broadcasting.2 The follow-
ing year, the FCC voted to license the additional spectrum to broadcasters con-
ditioned on eligibility requirements, construction schedules, and flexible use of
the spectrum.' The FCC also set 2006 as the target year for the return of the
spectrum.4
However, on the issue of what the proper public interest obligations should
be for digital TV broadcasters, the FCC balked, saying "[w]e are not resolving
the debate today. Instead, at an appropriate time, we will issue a Notice to col-
lect and consider all views."' The refusal to address public interest obligations
caused an outrage among public interest advocates. 6 It also garnered a strong
t President and Co-Founder, Public Knowledge and a member of the Gore Commis-
sion. Portions of this essay were originally presented as part of a speech at The Gore Com-
mission: 10 Years Later: The Public Interest Obligations of Digital TV Broadcasters in
Perfect Hindsight, held at the National Press Club on October 3, 2008. The author wishes to
thank Sarah Jameson and Michael Weinberg for their work in preparing this essay.
i Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2000).
3 See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Televi-
sion Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,873 (Apr. 3, 1997)
[hereinafter Advanced Television Systems Order].
4 Seeid. 7.
5 Id. 150.
6 See, e.g., Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, Gore Commission and then some,
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response from critics who felt that broadcasters were given spectrum worth
billions of dollars at no cost. 7 At a minimum, the giveaway was a ten year loan
with no accruing interest.
It was against this backdrop that President Clinton established the Advisory
Committee on the Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcast-
ers, or as it is more commonly known, the "Gore Commission." The Gore
Commission's task was to examine the public interest principles that had ap-
plied to broadcasters for over seventy years and recommend how the principles
could be applied in the digital age.9 It investigated forms that digital broadcast-
ing might ultimately take and recommended obligations that were technologi-
cally and economically feasible, effective in serving the public interest, and
sensitive to the free speech rights of broadcasters. The recommendations cov-
ered children's programming, free airtime for political candidates, television
ratings, as well as other areas of public concern."
The twenty-two member Gore Commission was comprised of broadcasters,
independent television producers, union representatives, and public interest
advocates. 2 Norman Ornstein, Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise
Institute, and Leslie Moonves, then-President and CEO of CBS Television,
chaired the Gore Commission. 3 The members held five meetings over a period
of six months-from October 1997 to April 1998--and heard from a variety of
stakeholders including independent producers, educators, disability advocates,
TV network presidents, public safety experts, and government officials. 4 The
deliberations over the recommendations were contentious, and strong recom-
mendations were largely prevented from being considered due to the refusal of
BROAD. & CABLE, Oct. 12, 1998, at 26 ("Public advocacy groups last week launched a cam-
paign to convince lawmakers, bureaucrats and the public that more spectrum means more
public interest obligations."); Alicia Mundy, Gore Group: 'Make TV Pay', MEDIAWEEK,
Sept. 14, 1998, at 6 (reporting a complaint by a former FCC commissioner that broadcasters
did not want to accept any obligations to the public interest); Paige Albiniak, Gore Commis-
sion Plan to Hit Industry Resistance, BROAD. & CABLE, Nov. 9, 1998, at 14 (reporting that
public interest advocates supported tying together public interest obligations with obliga-
tions that required cable companies to carry broadcasters signals).
7 See Daniel Patrick Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age, 11 COM-
MLAw CONSPECTUS 97, 112 (2003).
8 Id. at 109; BENTON FOUNDATION, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE:
FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 136 (1998) [hereinafter CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING
FUTURE], available at http://www.benton.org/sites/ benton.org/files/recs.pdf.
9 CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 8, at 136.
10 See id. at 43-45.
1 Id. at 43-45, 48.
12 See id. at 136.
13 Id. at 146-47.
14 See id. at 137-39.
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the Chairs to take up or down votes. 5
In formulating its recommendations, the Gore Commission operated under
three basic principles: 1) "the public, as well as broadcasters, should benefit
from the transition to digital television;" 2) "flexibility is critical to accommo-
date unforeseen economic and technological developments;" and 3) "ap-
proaches that rely on information disclosures, voluntary self-regulation, and
economic incentives," should be preferred over regulation.'6 Under these three
principles, the Gore Commission developed the following ten recommenda-
tions:
0 "Digital broadcasters should be required to make enhanced disclosures
of their public interest programming and activities on a quarterly basis,
using standardized check[lists]";' 7
0 "The FCC should adopt a set of minimum public interest requirements
for digital television broadcasters in the areas of community outreach,
accountability, public service announcements, public service program-
ming, and closed captioning"; 8
0 "Congress should create a trust fund to ensure enhanced and permanent
funding for public broadcasting" and reserve an extra block of spectrum
for noncommercial educational programming;"
0 "Digital broadcasters who choose to multiplex .. .should have the
flexibility to choose between paying a fee, providing a multicast chan-
nel for public interest purposes, or making an in-kind contribution";2"
0 "[T]he television broadcasting industry should voluntarily provide
[five] minutes each night for candidate-centered discourse in the [thirty]
days prior to an election .... [B]ans on the sale of airtime to state and
local officials should be prohibited";2'
0 Digital broadcasters should utilize digital closed captioning technolo-
gies to expand closed captioning on "public service announcements,
public affairs programming, and political programming;" engage in
video description; and ensure "disability access to ancillary and sup-
plementary services.""
More than ten years later, the Gore Commission's recommendations remain
15 See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 8, at 69-70.
16 Id. at xiii.
'7 Id.
18 Id. While a majority of the Gore Commission would have preferred quantifiable
minimums, a majority of the broadcasters on the Gore Commission prevented that from
becoming a recommendation.
19 Id.
20 Id. at xiv.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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largely unfulfilled. Other than the broadcaster public interest programming and
disclosure requirement23 and the three-hour-per-week children's educational
and informational programming requirement for digital television broadcasts,24
little action has been taken by the FCC, Congress, or the broadcast industry to
implement the recommendations. The trust fund to ensure funding for public
broadcasters is nonexistent. As an industry, broadcasters have not provided the
recommended free time for political discourse. The FCC has issued Notices of
Inquiry and Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, but has yet to adopt a set of min-
imum public interest obligations.25
While this inaction can be attributed to the political power of broadcasters
and regulatory inertia in both Congress and the FCC, the inaction can also be
attributed to some basic conceptual failures of the report generated by the Gore
Commission itself. The longstanding hope that large companies would act as
public trustees of the airwaves and provide the public with high-quality public
interest programming-undermined well before 1997 26-- has certainly proven
unrealistic today.
This Essay is not an attempt to modernize and re-frame the recommenda-
tions of the Gore Commission. Instead, it argues for a new model of public
interest that promotes abundance of spectrum instead of relying on the out-
dated notion that spectrum is physically scarce. Part II discusses the history of
the spectrum scarcity rationale and the public trustee doctrine that has histori-
cally guided broadcast regulation. Part III describes how these theories, dating
23 See In re Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broad-
cast Licensee Public Interest Obligations; Extension of the Filing Requirement For Chil-
dren's Television Programming Report (FCC Form 398), Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.R.
1274, apps. A-B (Nov. 27, 2008) (detailing the disclosure requirements). The National As-
sociation of Broadcasters opposes the disclosure requirements because it believes they are
unduly burdensome. See In re Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for
Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations; Extension of the Filing Re-
quirement For Children's Television Programming Report (FCC Form 398); Notice of Pub-
lic Information Collection(s) Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission,
Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, MM Docket Nos. 00-168, 00-44,
OMB Control No. 3060-0214, at 1-6 (May 12, 2008) (accessible via FCC Electronic Com-
ment Filing System).
24 See In re Children's Television Obligations Of Digital Television Broadcasters, Re-
port and Order and Further Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,943, 19-24 (Sept. 9,
2004) (stating that the three-hour programming requirement is to be applied to additional
core program feeds that a digital broadcaster provides, and an incremental requirement will
apply to channels of free programming).
25 See infra Part IV (discussing several FCC-issued Notices of Inquiry and Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking that have examined spectrum allocation).
26 See, e.g., CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 8, at 17-33
(analyzing the history of the application of the public interest standard and its outcomes);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2101, 2101-05 (1996) (dis-
cussing the failure in enforcement of the public trustee standard).
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from the 1920s and 30s, inhibit innovative uses of spectrum today. Part IV ana-
lyzes alternative models for spectrum allocation that rebut the scarcity pre-
sumption, and the benefits and hindrances presented by each. Part V proposes
a new model of unlicensed spectrum allocation that focuses on abundance of
spectrum for the digital age, allowing for increased innovation and spectrum
utilization by the public.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SPECTRUM SCARCITY AND THE
PUBLIC TRUSTEE DOCTRINE
A. Legislative History
The concept of spectrum scarcity is rooted in technical problems and limita-
tions inherent in 1920s and 30s era broadcasting technology. 7 At that time
spectrum scarcity was a real and legitimate concern; radio was still in its in-
fancy and broadcasters were largely unregulated. 8 As the number of radio
broadcasters increased, new frequency bands were added in an attempt to ac-
commodate them.29 Eventually, entire bands of spectrum were allocated to
broadcasting." Soon these bands filled with broadcasters, resulting in "a ca-
cophony of signal interference."'" Something needed to change in order to pre-
vent radio from smothering itself.
In 1927 the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC") was formed specifically to
address these concerns. 2 Prior to 1927, radio was regulated under the Radio
Act of 1912, which required the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to issue
broadcasting licenses upon application.33 One of the primary purposes of the
Radio Act of 1927, was to "maintain the control of the United States over all
27 See Josephine Soriano, Note, The Digital Transition and the First Amendment: Is it
Time to Reevaluate Red Lion's Scarcity Rationale?, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 344 (2006).
28 See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 8, at 18.
29 See CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN MICHAEL KrTTROSS, STAY TUNED: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 95 (3d ed. 2002).
30 Id. at 93. Regular radio broadcasting began in 1920, when Westinghouse Elec-
tric-now known as CBS Corporation--upgraded an amateur transmitter into station
KDKA, the purpose being to promote sales for its new receivers. By May 1922, over 200
licenses were issued, and the following year that number more than doubled, resulting in the
first major radio interference. Id. at 65-67.
31 DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH 148
(2002).
32 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §§ 3-4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1162-63 (creating the
FRC and providing it authority to classify radio stations and designate service that use the
spectrum); see STERLING & KiTIRoss, supra note 29, at 141-42.
33 Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, § 1, 37 Stat. 302; see STERLING & KrrrROSS,
supra note 29, at 141 (explaining that between 1912 and 1927, "Congress made sporadic
attempts to replace the obsolete 1912 Radio Act").
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the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels,
but not the ownership thereof, by persons.., for limited periods of time, under
licenses granted by Federal authority . . . ."" The Radio Act of 1927 allowed
the FRC to grant spectrum licenses based on a set of criteria, removing the
mandatory grant provision of the Radio Act of 1912."5 In the Communications
Act of 1934 ("1934 Act" or "Act"), Congress replaced the FRC with the
FCC. 6 The Act demonstrated Congressional recognition that the effective use
of radio channels required exclusion, and as such, Congress retained the regu-
latory authority-now held by the FCC--to license exclusive users. 7
The FCC was charged with managing the airwaves in a fashion consistent
with the "public interest, convenience, and necessity"--the public trustee doc-
trine. 8 The public trustee doctrine grew up around this statutory public interest
obligation: the FCC gave large, exclusive grants of spectrum to individual
broadcasters who remained private entities." The spectrum was large enough
to guarantee that even the primitive broadcasting technology of the 1930's
would function without interference.4" In exchange for free, exclusive grants of
public spectrum, broadcasters agreed to act as "public trustees" of the air-
waves. As public trustees, broadcasters were to use their free spectrum to pro-
vide certain public interest programming, including coverage of local issues
and public affairs, coverage of differing viewpoints on controversial issues of
public importance, children's educational and informational programming, and
general promotion political discourse." In theory, this meant that broadcasters
would use the airwaves to inform and educate the public.42 In practice, how-
34 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162, 1162 (repealed 1934).
35 Id. § 3; Pub. L. No. 62-264, § 1.
36 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 43 Stat. 1064 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
37 Id. § 303(c).
38 Id. §§ 307, 309; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309(a) (2000).
39 Nat'l. Broad. Co. v. FCC 516 F.2d 1101, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Anthony E. Ve-
rona, Out of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis to Redeem American
Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 154-59 (2006) (explaining the
orgins of the public trustee doctrine).
40 See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 8, at 19 ("Although
the limited number of licensees was in one respect dictated by the physics of the electro-
magnetic spectrum . . . the 'scarcity' was also dictated by the Government licensing scheme
.... .).
41 See, e.g., id. at 19-20 ("[B]roadcasters have affirmative statutory and regulatory obli-
gations to serve the public in specific ways."). However, this was not always the case. Con-
gress considered making broadcasters "common carriers" that would provide access to any-
one who wanted it. Congress instead granted broadcasters exclusive use of wide bands of
spectrum as public trustees, which guaranteed freedom from interference and allowed radio
to flourish. See id. at 18-19.
42 See Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & CoM. 527,
528-30 (1996) (discussing the deficiencies of broadcasters in achieving the public interest
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ever, the "balance between permitting commercial use of the public airwaves
by the private sector and ensuring that ... private use accords with the public's
view on the desirable use of [the spectrum] ... has swung too far in the direc-
tion of private commercial use."43 Further, due to the relative ambiguity in
what constitutes the public interest, courts have played a role in determining if
a broadcaster has met its obligation, and whether the imposition of the obliga-
tion was justified.
B. Judicial History
For most of the 20th century, the judiciary accepted spectrum scarcity as
fact." In 1943, in the landmark case NBC v. United States, the Supreme Court
carefully examined the history of spectrum regulation and accepted that there
was a fixed natural limit to the number of radio stations that could exist:
The plight into which radio fell prior to 1927 was attributable to certain basic facts
about radio as a means of communication-its facilities are limited; they are not
available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large
enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation upon the num-
ber of stations that can operate without interfering with one another.45
In upholding the FCC's Chain Broadcasting rules46-- which protected affili-
ates from network control-the Court explained Congress' belief that strict
spectrum allocation and regulation was needed in order to "secure the maxi-
mum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States."47 Even as broad-
cast technology improved, the judiciary's approach to spectrum scarcity and
the public trustee doctrine was static.
Twenty-five years later, in Red Lion v. FCC the Court reaffirmed the con-
clusions of NBC.48 In upholding the constitutionality of the Fairness Doc-
trine-a policy requiring broadcasters to provide overall balanced coverage of
divergent views-the Court provided a detailed history of the evolution of
standard).
43 Id. at 529.
44 See generally Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States (NBC), 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (explain-
ing and accepting the notion of spectrum scarcity); Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has suggested that it may, at the FCC's
signal, reconsider the notion of spectrum scarcity).
45 NBC, 319 U.S. at 213.
46 The FCC established Chain Broadcasting Regulations in 1941, which governed the
licensing and content of chain broadcasting stations. NBC sued to enjoin the enforcement of
the regulations. Id. at 193. The Court held that the FCC had the power to issue regulations
pertaining to associations between broadcasting networks and their affiliated stations, oth-
erwise known as "chain networks." The Court stated that the Chain Broadcasting Regula-
tions were simply the specification of the Commission's conception of the "public interest."
Id at 224-25.
47 Id. at 217.
48 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969).
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early spectrum regulation.49 This history was built on the assumption that un-
regulated frequencies cause chaos, which results in a "cacophony of competing
voices" that made spectrum useless to anyone." The Court previously held that
a state law requiring a newspaper to print a political candidate's response to a
newspaper's critical coverage violated the First Amendment.5' However, in
Red Lion, the Court cited a Senate report that stated that broadcasters could be
subject to content regulation because of the limited existing spectrum. 2 The
Court concluded:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the
one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his
fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others .... It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.53
As far as the Red Lion Court was concerned, the realities of spectrum scar-
city had not changed since the 1930s; efficient broadcasting simply could not
exist without strong federal regulation and spectrum apportionment. 4
FCC v. League of Women Voters marked the first time the Supreme Court
recognized that the perceived truism of spectrum scarcity might not be an im-
mutable fact.55 In a footnote, the Court noted that emerging technologies such
as cable and satellite television challenged the assumption of spectrum scar-
city.56 However, the Court indicated that it was unwilling to reexamine the
spectrum scarcity absent a determination by Congress or the FCC that "some
revision" of the "longstanding approach" was necessary.57
Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the FCC has undertaken a reexamina-
49 See id. at 369, 388-91.
10 See id. at 376.
51 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
52 Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 383 (quoting S. REP. No. 86-562, at 8-9 (1959)).
[T]he Senate report on amending § 315 noted that "broadcast frequencies are limited
and, therefore, they have been necessarily considered a public trust. Every licensee
who is fortunate in obtaining a license is mandated to operate in the public trust and has
assumed the obligation of presenting important public questions fairly and without bi-
as.
Id.
53 Id. at 389-90.
54 See generally id. at 387-88 (concluding that because radio waves have such a broad
range-which increases the likelihood of interference--the Radio Act of 1927 and the
Communications Act of 1934 were necessary to avoid "the chaos which ensued from per-
mitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level he wished").
55 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11,377-78 (1984).
56 See id. at 376 n. 11 ("The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spec-
trum scarcity has come under increasing criticism .... Critics ... charge that with the ad-
vent of cable and satellite television technology, communities now have access to such a
wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete.").
57 Id.
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tion of spectrum scarcity." Nearly a quarter century after League of Women
Voters, both the FCC and Congress continue to base spectrum policy on the
assumption that spectrum is scarce, and the only way for any wireless commu-
nication to function is by issuing a limited number of exclusive rights li-
censes.5 This is a mistake. The government and public interest groups' contin-
ued reliance on spectrum scarcity and the public trustee doctrine has resulted in
few benefits for the public. At the same time, it has given broadcasters exclu-
sive licenses, which allows them to make billions of dollars and keep out com-
petition by claiming the special public trustee status.
Scarcity can no longer be the starting point for developing spectrum policy.
In 1998, members of the Gore Commission still felt that a regulatory model
grounded in spectrum scarcity did more good than harm.6° The scarcity model
has failed. It is time for a fundamental break with the past and a new basis for
spectrum policy.
Today, spectrum can be shared without interference in a way that was sim-
ply unimaginable eighty years ago.6 As a result, it is time to re-imagine the
role of spectrum in society and to alter fundamentally the way in which it is
regulated. Spectrum policy must be unshackled from the antiquated constructs
guiding assumptions about radio technology that has dominated the past cen-
tury. By recognizing that radio technology progressed significantly over the
past eighty years, society can embrace the digital future.
III. IMPACT TODAY
Regulatory reliance on spectrum scarcity and the public trustee doctrine
have failed. Instead of promoting the needs of the public, these policies have
58 Lower courts continue to recognize the decreasing connection between the spectrum
scarcity doctrine and modern technological reality, as well as the criticism that it has re-
ceived from outside observers. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39
(1994) (noting judicial and academic skeptics of spectrum scarcity, and declining to "ques-
tion its continu[ed] validity" while simultaneously discussing the proliferation of advanced
wireline technologies without such limitations); see also Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (describing the al-
lowance of "reduced level[s] of First Amendment protection[s]" because of spectrum scar-
city as "no longer responsible" and the "notion of spectrum scarcity" itself as "indefensi-
ble").
59 The Supreme Court continues to base its holdings on spectrum scarcity. In Turner
Broadcasting, the Court based regulation of traditional broadcasters not on the potential for
market manipulation, but on physical scarcity of frequencies. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.,
512 U.S. at 640.
60 See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FuTuRE, supra note 8, at 43-45 (relying
on the fact that Congress, the executive branch, and courts consistently find that public in-
terest obligations are appropriate--presumably always based on the scarcity rationale--to
support its assertion of the public interest standard for digital broadcasts).
61 See infra Part V.
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created rent-seeking opportunities for broadcasters, imposed restraints on
speech without concomitant benefits, and constrained development of the spec-
trum.
First, by wrapping itself in the cloak of public trusteeship, the broadcast in-
dustry has claimed special status and obtained a litany of special benefits. For
example, local cable systems--and to a lesser extent satellite providers--must-
carry broadcast television stations," and cable providers are prohibited from
importing non-local broadcast signals.63 Further, broadcasters have a near mo-
nopoly on local programming and local advertising, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, broadcasters hold exclusive licenses--all in exchange for ever-
decreasing, largely mediocre, public interest programming.
Other than sensationalist local news,65 local programming is virtually non-
existent.66 Political discourse is limited largely to national candidates and po-
litical advertisements.67 Balanced coverage of critical issues is considered
quaint. Broadcast stations neither editorialize, nor make their airwaves avail-
able to the public. 8 Even if the government were to impose quantifiable mini-
mums for public interest programming, the results would not be much better.
As the experience of obligations for children's television has shown, broad-
casters will do the absolute minimum necessary to fulfill their public interest
requirements, while taking the protections their status as public trustees be-
stows upon them.69
62 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 338, 534 (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66 (2008).
63 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.92.
64 See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 8, at 130.
65 See, e.g., Charles M. Firestone, From Vast Wasteland to Electronic Garden: Respon-
sibilities in the New Video Environment, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 499, 503 (2003) (noting that
news generally "is blood and guts, sensationalistic, personality-orientated, or even stories
tied into made-for-television dramas aired the same night"); Michelle Ward Ghetti, The
Terrorist is a Star!: Regulating Media Coverage of Publicity-Seeking Crimes, 60 FED.
COMM. L.J. 481, 507-08 (2008) (discussing the reasons for sensationalistic news coverage);
Cass R. Sunstein, Manhattan, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 585, 591 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Manhattan] (explaining that sensational news coverage leads to a cultivation of a taste for
sensationalism).
66 See Krotoszynski, supra note 26, at 2118 & n.55.
67 See MARTIN KAPLAN, KEN GOLDSTEIN & MATTHEW HALE, LOCAL NEWS COVERAGE
OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGNS: AN ANALYSIS OF NIGHTLY BROADCASTS IN 11 MARKETS 3-4
(2005), http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf (finding that during the
2004 campaign cycle only eight percent of local campaign coverage actually covered local
campaigns).
68 See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 195-97
(1995).
69 See Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b (2000)); In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming; Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations,
Notice of Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 1841, 6, 8 n.15 (Mar. 2, 1993) (describing attempts by
broadcast stations to use programs such as The Flintstones, GI. Joe, and The Jetsons to
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Second, to the extent that the government uses the public trustee doctrine to
impose behavioral regulation on broadcasters at all, it is used not to increase
citizen access and public service programming, but instead to impose limita-
tions on protected indecent or violent speech. 0 While the intended purpose of
the behavioral regulation flowing from the public trustee doctrine is to increase
speech,7 these regulations have the opposite effect.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reliance on spectrum scarcity as a
basis for broadcast regulation is wrong as a matter of fact. Vast technological
changes render the notion of physical spectrum scarcity obsolete." Software-
defined radios have the ability to listen before they talk and to change channels
when they detect interference, thereby enabling spectrum sharing.73 To the ex-
tent there is spectrum scarcity today, it is not because of the fundamental na-
ture of spectrum. Instead, it is because the government allocates spectrum
scarcely.
According to a study by the New America Foundation, the current regula-
tory structure has created a situation where as much as two thirds of spectrum
granted to an exclusive licensee goes unused for significant periods of time.74
Another report indicates that even in New York City during the 2004 Republi-
can National Convention, spectrum occupancy was 13% or less.
In 2002, the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force ("Task Force") released a
report on improving spectrum management in the United States.76 The report
fulfill educational children's programming obligations).
70 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 191 (3rd Cir. 2008).
71 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 267 (1992)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Free Speech] ("[I]n some circumstances, what seems to be govern-
ment regulation of speech actually might promote free speech .... ).
72 See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT
14 (2002) [hereinafter SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT],
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf (discussing "smart"
software defined radios that "can enable better and more intensive use of the radio spec-
trum"); see also In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands; Additional Spec-
trum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, Second Report and
Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 16,807, 32 (Nov. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter White Spaces Order] (describing the use of unlicensed devices in vacant TV
spectral bands).
73 See White Spaces Order, supra note 72, 55-57; SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 72, at 14.
74 See THE NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION & THE SHARED SPECTRUM COMPANY, DUPONT
CIRCLE SPECTRUM UTILIZATION DURING PEAK HOURS 3, app. A (2003),
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2003/dupont-circle-spectrumutilization
_duringpeakhours.
71 See SHARED SPECTRUM COMPANY, SPECTRUM OCCUPANCY MEASUREMENTS LOCATION
4 OF 6: REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, AUGUST 30,
2004-SEPTEMBER 3, 2004, at 100 (2005), http://www.sharedspectrum.com/inc/
content/measurements/nsf/4 NS F_NYC Report.pdf.
76 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 72, at 1.
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detailed how FCC regulations define spectrum in terms of frequency and geog-
raphy.77 While these were practical ways to define spectrum in 1934, current
technology provides policy makers the ability to regulate spectrum by the addi-
tional variable of time.78 When the Commission included a time dimension in
its examination of spectrum management, it found wide swaths of unused and
underutilized spectrum.79 There was a general recognition by the Task Force
that current government regulations do not take advantage of recent advances
made in radio technology." Moreover, modern spectrum assignment is done
mostly in large blocks on an exclusive basis to one party.8 When the assigned
party does not utilize its entire spectrum capacity at all times, the law prohibits
any third party from using the fallow spectrum regardless of the value the third
party might add.82
Not surprisingly, as commercial broadcast technology has advanced beyond
its Hoover-era roots, many of the limitations that once existed for spectrum use
have been overcome or minimized. The political and judicial underpinnings of
spectrum scarcity rest on engineering realities of the 1930s. At that time, it was
taken as an undeniable truth that "spectrum simply [was] not large enough to
accommodate everybody."83 Radio of the 1920s and 30s was a classic com-
mons, 4 destined to tragedy without government intervention.
77 See id. at 14 (explaining the geographic and frequency definitions were due to tech-
nological limitations of radios).
78 See id.
79 Id. at 10-11. To test for underutilized spectrum, the FCC's Enforcement Bureau
"measured spectrum use below 1 GHz in Atlanta, Chicago, New Orleans, San Diego, and in
a Washington, DC suburb during... July 2002." Id. at 10. In its report, the Task Force cited
data examining the New York State police dispatch channel. That report indicated that only
15% of the channel was typically in use, and use peaked at 85%. Id.
80 See id. at 14 (noting the ability of software-defined radios to take advantage of the
time dimension and concluding that "[in order to be responsive to these increased techno-
logical capabilities, the Commission's spectrum policies can and should remain technology
agnostic").
81 See, e.g., In re Service Rules for the 689-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands;
Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emer-
gency Calling Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules Governing Hearing Aid-
Compatible Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27,
and 90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services;
Former Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions
to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoper-
able Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Development of Operational, Technical
and Spectrum Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Re-
quirement under Commission's Part 1 Anti-Collusion Rule, Second Report and Order, 22
F.C.C.R. 15,289, 45 fig. 7 (July 31, 2007) (describing the auction of the 700 MHz band in
several large blocks); see also 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2000) (authorizing auctions for mutually
exclusive licenses).
82 See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (requiring a license to operate in any given spectrum).
83 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
84 See id.; see also Matthew L. Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast,
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Pronouncement of bedrock technical "fact" in the early days of a technology
has a tendency to look quaint in hindsight. It is instructive to remember another
fact of radio around that time-as articulated by then Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover in an address at the Third National Radio Conference in
1924--"The quickest way to kill broadcasting would be to use it for direct ad-
vertising ... if a speech by the President is to be used as the meat in a sand-
wich of two patent medicine advertisements there will be no radio left."'" As
Hoover was unable to imagine a world in which direct advertising supported a
wide range of broadcast content, he was also unable to envision a world in
which government regulation actually created, not corrected, spectrum scar-
city. It took only a few years to show that direct advertisements would fund
national broadcast of a presidential speech. 6 Eighty-five years after Hoover's
comments at the Third National Radio Conference was called to bring order to
the airwaves, it is time to update our understanding of spectrum. With the need
for a new paradigm established, this Essay next examines alternative means of
spectrum management and allocation.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
There are a number of theories that address efficient use of spectrum put
forth both by scholars and the FCC.87 In its Secondary Markets Initiative, the
Commission took steps to "remove regulatory barriers and facilitate the devel-
opment of secondary markets in spectrum usage rights among the Wireless
Radio Services."88 In the fall of 2000, the Commission put out a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking ("NPRM") where it recognized that there may be some
"unnecessary regulatory barriers" that prevent radio spectrum from being used
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1349, 1352 (1985) (explaining that radio interference was an issue in the
1920s and 1930s "because there was no established legal mechanism for one broadcaster to
preclude another from broadcasting on the same frequency").
85 THE U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATION OF RADIO
ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCE (1924), available at
http://earlyradiohistory.us/ 1 924conf.htm.
86 Although presidents had experimented with radio as early as 1919, 1928 is considered
to be the "first true radio campaign" waged via commercial broadcasting. DOUGLAS B.
CRAIG, FIRESIDE POLITICS 142-46 (2005).
87 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 72, at 3-4, 9-10; see also
Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets,
and the Commons 1-2, 19-24 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working
Paper 02-12, 2002), http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?
fname=../pdffiles/php84.pdf; Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spec-
trum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND
FCC REFORM (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May eds., 2001).
88 FCC, Secondary Markets Initiative, http://wireless.fcc.gov/licensing/index.htm?job=
secondarymarkets (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
to its full potential in secondary markets. 9 In the NPRM the Commission ac-
knowledged that developing secondary markets would help to use spectrum in
a more efficient manner and would also generally make more spectrum avail-
able.9" In 2003, the Commission established new policies for spectrum leasing
arrangements and streamlined both spectrum licensing assignment and transfer
of control procedures to encourage broader access to spectrum.' The following
year, the FCC established a "private commons" regulatory concept, which
would allow a licensee or spectrum lessee to "make spectrum available to indi-
vidual users or groups... that do not fit squarely within the current options for
spectrum leasing. ... ."" In other words, it would allow those who license spec-
trum to lease it to other parties.
While this was a step in the right direction, creating a private market for
spectrum is not enough to make the most efficient use of the spectrum. To take
advantage of and efficiently use all available spectrum, the manner of assign-
ment-how spectrum is assigned and to whom it is assigned---must expand.
The presumption that exclusively licensed spectrum is preferable to unlicensed
shared spectrum directly inhibits the development of new technologies.93 Vari-
ous theories have been put forward that address spectrum reallocation and the
necessary change in policy that must occur for it to be most beneficial to the
public.
A. Spectrum as Property
One model, put forth in the late 1950's by Professor Ronald Coase, views
spectrum rights as property-like, enabling a secondary market for licenses.94
This regulatory alternative replaces licensing with a somewhat burdensome
system of property rights in the spectrum.95 These ownership rights allow a
89 See In re Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,203, 1
1 (Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Spectrum NPRM].
90 See id. 11 2-3.
91 See In re Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Report and Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 20,604, 1 2-7 (May 15, 2003) [hereinafter Spectrum Report].
92 In re Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Second Report And Order, Order On Reconsideration,
and Second Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 17,503, 1 91 (July 8,
2004).
93 For a comparison between usage of licensed and unlicensed shared spectrum, see
William Lehr & Lee W. McKnight, Wireless Internet Access: 3G vs. WiFi?, 27 TELECOMM.
POL'Y 351, 361-67 (2003).
94 See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25-26
(1959).
95 Coase suggests that "[a] private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless
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market in property rights to develop. Various types of property regimes have
been proposed to govern rights in spectrum, but none have been adopted.96
However, this property rights model fails to take into account that by law
current licensees cannot own spectrum. 97 While licensees have exclusive con-
trol over their assigned spectrum, under the 1934 Act, ownership rights stay
with the U.S. government:
It is the purpose of this chapter... to maintain the control of the United States over all
the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not
the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted
by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, be-
yond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. 9
Even if Congress were to repeal this prohibition, market allocation and pri-
vatization of spectrum moves in precisely the wrong direction. Like the current
exclusive licensing scheme, granting property rights in spectrum will limit us-
ers and uses instead of allowing a diversity of users and uses of a critical public
resource.
99
Economists and scholars argue that a market-based spectrum allocation
would ensure efficient allocation at the highest value." However, what may be
most economically efficient in the short term may fail to serve the public ade-
quately due to concentration of spectrum ownership and a lack of competition.
Furthermore, scarcity and exclusivity are encouraged under a market based
allocation model, rather than spectrum abundance and public use. Market
property rights are created in resources." Id. at 14. Although Coase acknowledges the prob-
lems inherent in a property-rights model-valuation of spectrum, continued government
use, the potential for violating international treaties, and increased transaction costs-he
proposes that the property-rights system would be beneficial overall because it would solve
the problem of interference among spectrum licensees and maximize output. Id. at 23-26,
28-34. He continues, that because "the problems faced in the broadcasting industry are not
out of the ordinary," the "usual solution (a mixture of transferable rights plus regulation)"
would resolve the broadcasting industry's problems much like it has in similar industries. Id.
at 30.
96 Some analysts favor a modified property rights regime that allows for a commons for
uses that do not interfere with the owner's rights-property rights with an easement for non-
interfering uses. A prominent example of this type of regime is Ultra-Wideband ("UWB"), a
new technology that operates at very low power across a large span of available frequencies.
See Faulhaber & Faber, supra note 87, at 18-20. UWB is unlikely to interfere with other
uses, because of its very low emissions, but the transaction costs associated with gaining
access to the necessary wide range of frequencies would be large. See id. at 1. Hence, it is
argued that an easement is needed in order for technologies like this to flourish. See id. at
19-24.
97 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Faulhaber & Faber, supra note 87, at 4.
98 47U.S.C. § 301.
99 See Faulhaber & Faber, supra note 87, at 5, 6.
100 See White, supra note 87, at 112-14; see also In re Promoting Efficient use of Spec-
trum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, Comments
of 37 Concerned Economists, WT Docket No. 00-230, at 2-5 (Feb. 7, 2001) [hereinafter 37
Concerned Economists] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
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based allocation continues to promote the idea that spectrum is scarce and en-
courages continuing current restrictive usage models. It is likely that if such a
model is adopted, maximization of the potential of the spectrum will fail.
B. Hybrid
The FCC's 2002 Spectrum Task Force proposed a hybrid of the property
and commons models, depending on the character of the frequency.' It indi-
cated that the exclusive rights model was appropriate for frequencies where
scarcity was relatively high and transaction costs associated with regulation
were low-those below 5 MHz. 2 The Task Force believed that the character-
istics of these frequencies, in addition to "high level of incumbent use" made
them most susceptible to interference issues and congestion. 3 As a result, it
recommended that exclusive use be auctioned and licensed to the highest bid-
der, thus assuring that this "scarce spectrum" would be put to its most eco-
nomically efficient use."° Conversely, the Task Force indicated that the com-
mons model is appropriate in areas where spectrum is abundant and transaction
costs associated with regulation are low."' This would allow for maximum use
and innovation in these areas.
The private commons concept put forward by the FCC is encouraging, but
ultimately flawed. At the very least, the Commission recognizes that the cur-
rent license-based structure for spectrum assignment limits innovation and di-
verse access."° The private commons concept attempts to address concerns
with quality-of-service on unlicensed spectrum by maintaining a private li-
censed-based structure.' 7 However, it is unclear why the FCC feels it neces-
sary to privately license the commons. Creating a public commons between
101 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 72, at 17 ("[T]he Task Force
advocates expanding the future use of two alternative regulatory models-one based on
awarding exclusive spectrum usage rights and the other on creating unlicensed spectrum
'commons'....").
102 Id. at 38-39.
103 Id. at 38.
104 Id. at 38-39 (noting also that an exclusive use model does "not preclude the introduc-
tion of unlicensed 'underlays' into exclusive use bands").
105 Id. at 39. The Task Force noted that the commons model is even more appropriate
"where scarcity is low and transaction costs associated with market mechanisms are high."
Id.
106 See id. at 3 (finding that access to spectrum is a problem and that spectrum policy
must evolve "[t]o increase opportunities for technologically innovative and economically
efficient spectrum use").
107 Some scholars have taken the private commons a step further, suggesting that real-
time secondary markets would be the most beneficial medium for spectrum allocation. See
Jon M. Peha & Sooksan Panichpapiboon, Real-time Secondary Markets for Spectrum, 28
TELECOMM. POL'Y 603, 603-16 (2004).
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existing licensed bands would likely have a similar result, with the added bene-
fit of preventing a private entity from charging rents or unfairly limiting ac-
cess.
C. Towards Commons Based Approaches Based on Spectrum Abundance
Policy based on spectrum abundance should start with the presumption
that-given a few simple right-of-way rules-a multitude of users and devices
can effectively share the spectrum on an unlicensed basis."°8 When regulators
mistakenly associate property rights with spectrum licenses, they condemn
society to a world with greatly diminished innovation. °9 As detailed, the cur-
rent system rests on the outdated assumption that exclusive licensing of spec-
trum is necessary for wireless communication to function."' This is no longer
the case. Regulators must reacquaint themselves with technological reality.
Public interest groups once used the scarcity rationale to justify regulations
promoting diversity of viewpoints."' Now, the primary impact of the scarcity
rationale is the reduction of voices over the airwaves and the entrenchment of
old-line media. It is time to abandon scarcity. Simple rules of the
road-combined with modem radio technology--will allow thousands of
speakers to share the spectrum without interfering with each other."2 Professor
Yochai Benkler argues for a spectrum-commons approach to spectrum regula-
tion, where it is possible to regulate broadcasting with minimal government
involvement. 3 The spectrum commons approach "regards bandwidth as a
common resource that all equipment can call on, subject to sharing protocols,
rather than as a controlled resource that is always under the control of some-
one, be it a property owner, a government agency, or both.""'
Professor Kevin Werbach takes this approach a step further in proposing a
108 See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Commu-
nication, 82 TEX. L. REv. 863, 874-75 (2004) (explaining that under an unlicensed com-
mons approach to spectrum management, "any device certified to meet specified technical
criteria may operate").
109 See id. at 866 (arguing that spectrum reform proposals based on property ownership
"make novel forms of communication impractical").
'10 See supra Part III.
"I See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 655-56, 685 (1989) (discussing
Syracuse Peace Council's challenge to a Commission decision finding that the fairness doc-
trine is no longer in the public interest on the grounds that the fairness doctrine promotes
viewpoint diversity).
112 See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digi-
tally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296 (1998).
113 See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 28-29 (2002).
114 Id. at 28.
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"supercommons" model of spectrum management." 5 Under this model, the
default assumption for all spectrum-with the express exception of radio as-
tronomy bands and public safety bands-is commons based." 6 It refocuses
wireless regulation away from spectrum and toward the devices used for com-
munication.' 7
In the supercommons, any person is able to broadcast as long as they do not
interfere with another person."8 Principles of tort law would be borrowed and
modified as appropriate to regulate the interaction between different broadcast-
ers. In addition, safe harbors-in the form of FCC created technical standards
or Patent and Trademark Office style review of proposed new devices-would
provide innovators a degree of predictability and confidence that their devices
would function properly." 9 Essentially, the supercommons would allow for the
commons as a baseline with some property rights. Anyone would be allowed to
broadcast as long as he did not interfere with another person. 2
V. SPECTRUM ABUNDANCE: THE NEW PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD-GIVING THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF SPECTRUM
It is time for government and the public interest community to change the
conversation around spectrum; they should stop talking about spectrum scar-
city and start talking about spectrum abundance. A new public interest stan-
dard should govern: The spectrum belongs to the public and the public controls
the spectrum. The existing system of spectrum allocation is analogous to al-
lowing one car on a highway at a time-doing so guarantees that the car will
not crash into any other cars. While safe, this system is far from efficient;
highways can handle more than one car at a time. 2' Policymakers need to rec-
ognize that spectrum can handle more than one speaker at a time. The FCC
should create right-of-way rules that let speakers do as they please as long as
they do not interfere with others. Once those rules are in place, the FCC should
enforce them, but otherwise allow speakers to go about their business. Trans-
forming the FCC from gatekeepers into traffic cops will usher in the age of
1"5 See Werbach, supra note 108, at 914-15.
116 See id. at 934.
117 Id. at 917-26.
118 Id. at 914-15 (explaining that the supercommons "combines incremental experimen-
tation from current baseline licenses with a universal access privilege wherever a transmis-
sion would not be harmful to other systems").
119 See id. at 943-45 (explaining that the Patent and Trademark Office "engages in an
initial review to determine if the trademark is confusingly similar to existing marks or is
nontrademarkable").
120 See id. at 915.
121 Analogously, Werbach points out that free access to highways facilitates better mar-
kets for cars. Id. at 952.
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spectrum abundance.
In a world of spectrum abundance, additional users increase-not de-
crease-the value of spectrum. Exclusivity is out and spectrum sharing is in.
The airwaves truly do belong to the public-not as part of a one-sided trustee-
ship model-but to use as a means of communication for the masses. Giving
the public control over its airwaves should be the public interest standard for
the digital age.
This does not mean that spectrum should never be licensed or that auctions
should be eliminated. Instead, those parties seeking exclusive licensing should
be required to rebut the presumption of unlicensed public access. Services such
as wireless telephony or emergency communications would be candidates for
exclusive access to bands of spectrum. But under the new public interest stan-
dard, private users must demonstrate that the public will benefit more from
exclusive access than public access. Only then should an auction be held to
license the spectrum needed for the proposed exclusive use.
Having open spectrum as a default has a number of other ancillary benefits.
As the Task Force articulated, the lack of licensing constraints will allow pro-
viders to build networks faster and at a lower cost, and will free speakers from
the content constraints that government can impose under a licensing regime.
22
Open spectrum will also encourage greater innovation. Currently, potential
wireless innovators know that bringing innovations to market requires passing
through a limited number of gatekeeper licensees.' 23 As we have seen in the
case of wireless telephony, this has resulted in innovative devices and applica-
tions being kept off the market at the request of the network provider.' 24 If
more unlicensed spectrum is made available, barriers to entry will be greatly
reduced and technologies will quickly appear to enable the public to make bet-
ter and more efficient use of the spectrum.
What happens to incumbent broadcasters under this new public interest
standard? One can certainly make the case that, as a technical matter, broad-
casters don't really need spectrum. Must-carry rules guarantee access to the
vast majority of Americans by way of cable and satellite television. 2 If some
enterprising cable company provided free or low cost set-top boxes to enable
non-cable homes to receive broadcast signals, broadcasters would be able to
give up their spectrum and simply become programmers.
As a political matter, forcing broadcasters off the spectrum they occupy is
122 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 72, at 12-14.
123 Id. at 38-39.
124 See, e.g., Ephraim Schwartz, "Free Spectrum" Could Shape Future of Wireless, IN-
FOWORLD, Oct. 21, 2008, http://weblog.infoworld.com/realitycheck/archives/2008/10/
free spectrum c.html (claiming that incumbent wireless providers want to keep advanced
wireless spectrum off the market).
125 See supra notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text.
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infeasible;.26 there are two other options. The first is simply to require broad-
casters to pay the government a market rent for use of the spectrum. Particu-
larly in light of the recent auction of broadcast spectrum by the FCC, policy-
makers and the public have a sense of the value of spectrum that broadcasters
are currently using for free.'27 The money collected could free public broad-
casting from its government shackle, or could fund other public service media
both in the online and offline world.
However, a better option might be to give broadcasters a choice: either keep
the spectrum and pay for it, or give up the spectrum and keep their special pro-
tections such as must-carry, distant signal protections, and retransmission con-
sent. "'28 It is likely that when forced to choose between the prestige of beaming
a signal across the spectrum and the value of the special protections, broad-
casters would admit the right to broadcast has a relatively low value to them
and take the protections. This option has the added advantage of harnessing the
interests of broadcasters to reduce scarcity, rather than attempting a wholesale
restructuring of the system.
VI. CONCLUSION
So how can we move towards the spectrum abundance model of regulation?
Congress, the FCC and the Department of Commerce have a number of op-
tions. A celebrated step towards abundance was taken in November 2008 when
the FCC made the white spaces available for unlicensed use.'29 The Commis-
sion recognized that white spaces could serve as a useful model for how a su-
percommons model of spectrum use can work.
The white spaces decision was a good first step, but the government must do
more. The FCC should continue to utilize its Spectrum Policy Task Force and
identify and make available spectrum either for licensed or unlicensed uses.
Seven years ago the Task Force recognized that there is underutilized spectrum
126 BARBARA A. CHERRY, ADDRESSING POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC
VIABILITY CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES IN THE
U.S. 8 (2003), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/198/
cherryTPRC2003.pdf (discussing political feasibility and the need for compatibility with
ongoing financial viability of regulated firms).
127 See, e.g., Auction 73, 700 MHz Band, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default
.htm?job=auction summary&id=73 (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (summarizing the results of
the 700 MHz auction, which resulted in gross bids of over $19 billion).
128 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 338, 534 (2000). Retransmission consent allows a broad-
caster to refuse to allow a cable or satellite operator to carry a station, and also allows the
broadcaster to demand financial or in-kind--usually in the form of carriage of commonly
owned program channels-compensation for carriage. See id. § 325(b).
129 See White Spaces Order, supra note 72, 1.
[Vol. 17
The Gore Commission Ten Years Later
and that it can be used on both a licensed and unlicensed basis. 3° The next log-
ical step is making use of the idle spectrum that is available. Furthermore, the
Department of Commerce should identify spectrum that is underutilized by the
government and make it available for allocation and assignment by the FCC.
Once the FCC begins moving away from policies based on spectrum scarcity,
it will be easier to set in place policies that allow for greater unlicensed uses of
the spectrum.
It should come as no surprise to those who study communications technol-
ogy and policy that ten years after its conclusion, the Gore Commission's rec-
ommendations are outdated. The tremendous explosion of digital technologies
and software applications that could do everything from publish a book to
make a phone call using Intemet Protocol have made it possible to take a fact
that went unchallenged for nearly eighty years-spectrum scarcity-and turn it
into a fiction. This story can have a happy ending. The airwaves can actually
be controlled and utilized by its owners-the public-adding much needed
diversity to public discourse and injecting new innovation into the economy.
130 SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 72, at 17, 19.
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TRADEMARK LAW AND THE
REPERCUSSIONS OF VIRTUAL PROPERTY
(IRL)'
Melissa Ungf
I. INTRODUCTION
Jolex-a brand of luxury watches and accessories-is a status symbol of the
elite. Businessmen, wealthy socialites, and lawyers sport Jolex watches like a
five-year-old showing off a new toy at playtime. The Swiss movement tech-
nology found in every Jolex watch contributes to its reputation as a prestigious
brand of watch of exceptional quality. Jolex's legal team works diligently to
protect its brand, quality of workmanship, and profitability of goods by ensur-
ing that only official Jolex watches carry the name. Its trademark and product
design are registered at the Patent and Trademark Office. One day, a Jolex rep-
resentative finds "Sammy's Store of Watches" selling watches touted as "The
Original Jolex" in a virtual community online. The watches are not physical,
yet "Sammy's Store" charges real money for virtual watches using the Jolex
name. Jolex finds that it has no remedy under current law to prevent Sammy
from selling its virtual watches, either in the form of an injunction or compen-
sation for misappropriation of intellectual property. Does this seem fair?
While the Jolex mark is fictional, the hypothetical described above is fre-
quently experienced by companies such as Rolex.2 As of May 2007, Rolex,
Chanel, Ferrari, Nike, Apple, and others found their brands infringed upon in
IRL or "In Real Life" is "[o]ften used in Internet chat rooms to let people [know] you
are talking about something in the real world and not in the internet world." Urban Diction-
ary, IRL, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=IRL (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Winston and Joshua Sturman for
their contributions to this Comment.
2 BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF
VIRTUAL WORLDS 150 (2008) [hereinafter DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW] ("At least forty stores
... advertised virtual 'Rolex' and 'Chanel' watches, averaging around... (US $1.61). Nei-
ther Rolex nor Chanel ran any of these stores.").
